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Abstract
Advances in the field of economics and psychology have contributed greatly to the under-
standing of the supply of information when it affects the emotions and consequently the
decisions made by two parties. Yet, these studies assume that the parties have identical
utilities. In this article, focusing on the doctor–patient interaction, we relax the perfect
agency assumption, introduce the agent’s effort in supplying information, and analyze
the two parties’ interdependent decisions under asymmetric information. We show that
when the supplier of information fails to understand the receiver’s preferences the latter
will disregard completely the recommendation. We consider the policy recommendations
and welfare implications of the model. (JEL codes: C72, D8, I1)
Keywords: doctor–patient relationship, noncooperative game theory, policy recommen-
dations, psychological expected utility, supply of information, welfare implications
1 Introduction
Recent advances in the literature of economics and psychology have con-
tributed greatly to explaining the supply of information when this affects
the emotions of the agents and consequently their decisions. The models
draw upon the psychological expected utility (PEU) theory introduced by
Caplin and Leahy (2001). The PEU is an extension of von Neumann–
Morgenstern expected utility theory to situations in which agents experi-
ence feelings of anticipation regarding future states.
The PEU has been used by Caplin and Leahy to explain the optimal
level of information an expert should pass on to an ill-informed citizen
(Caplin and Leahy 2004). Ko¨szegi (2004) has also proposed a model
describing the doctor–patient relationship based on the PEU theory iden-
tifying a number of complications in their interaction that are attributed to
anxiety, such as the paradox of emotional patients getting less useful
information. In another article, Ko¨szegi (2003) develops a model focusing
on the patient’s decision whether to visit a doctor or not, when anxiety
enters his utility function. He then further develops it in a more general
case of the emotional agent (Ko¨szegi 2006).
However, all the above attempts to model the supply of information
when emotions are affected are based on the assumption that the provider
of this information is entirely empathetic to the other party and maximizes
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his utility function as if it were her own. In other words, all models assume
perfect agency relationship. But what happens if the supplier of the infor-
mation does not know the preferences of the other person? What if, in
addition, the transmission of information is costly?
The objective we are pursuing in this article is precisely to answer the
above questions. Our aim is to develop a model of the supply of informa-
tion between two agents, when this information affects their emotions but
it is also costly for the provider of the information to pass it on to the
other party. Furthermore, asymmetry of information adds more compli-
cations in reaching a mutually agreed decision. For that purpose, we
employ a noncooperative game theoretical model focusing on the
doctor–patient relationship as an emotional setting where transfer of
information is particularly important. The doctor–patient interaction
has received a lot of attention from a theoretical perspective (McGuire
2000) yet the impact of emotions in the two parties’ decisions is not prop-
erly examined. Of course, our model can be applied to any setting where
the information affects individuals’ emotions as when an employer and
employee discuss possible reductions in a company’s personnel or when a
teacher and a student consider the latter’s performance in the final
examination.
The originality of the model presented in this article lies in two aspects.
First, we relax the assumption of perfect agency that the models by Caplin
and Leahy (2004) and Ko¨szegi (2004) put forward. To do this, we intro-
duce a linear utility function for the doctor and the notion of ‘effort’ that
she needs to put in while supplying information to the patient. In contrast
to the games by Caplin and Leahy (2004) and Ko¨szegi (2004), ours is not a
signaling game, i.e. the doctor receives no message regarding the patient’s
preferences. Secondly, we give to the patient an active role in decision
making, and we allow for interdependent decisions under conditions of
asymmetric information between the two parties. The doctor, being uncer-
tain about the type of patient she diagnoses, decides how much informa-
tion to pass on. The patient, receiving this information, decides whether to
accept it or not. Both these elements, as well as the other key aspects of
our model are influenced by the medical literature in the area. This is
reviewed in the following section.
Our analysis shows that when the supplier of information fails to under-
stand the receiver’s preferences, the latter will disregard completely the
recommendation. In the example of the doctor–patient relationship that
we describe here, the implications of this become more apparent.
Adherence to medication, generally defined as ‘the extent to which
patients take medications as prescribed by their health-care providers’
(Osterberg and Blaschke 2005), is of increasing importance in health
care as it improves outcomes and controls health care costs. For example,
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a review of studies on antipsychotic treatment estimated that the national
re-hospitalization costs related to nonadherence was on average $1.479
million in the USA in 2005 (Sun et al. 2007).
The rest of this article is organized in the following way. Section 2
summarizes observable facts from the medical literature that lead to the
conceptualization of our model. Particular emphasis is given to the supply
of information during the consultation and how this affects communica-
tion and the final decisions. Section 3 presents our model which takes the
form of a noncooperative game between the doctor and the patient.
Section 4 discusses the main findings of our model, along with the
policy recommendations and welfare implications. These are based on
ways of improving adherence rates, analyzing the solution of the model,
and on the effects of changing the values of the various parameters.
Section 5 summarizes and concludes the discussion.
2 Motivating Facts
There is consistent evidence showing that the flow of information
exchanged during the consultation is very critical for the formulation of
diagnosis and the organization of treatment (Lambert and Loiselle 2007).
Thus, effective communication is necessary to ensure not only that the
doctor understands the patients’ problems and concerns but also that
appropriate information on diagnosis and treatment is accurately and
effectively transferred to maximize the benefits from consultation
(Weinmann 1997).
Information regarding patients’ health affects their emotions, and
patients vary in their preferences regarding how much they want to
know about their health (Miller and Mangan 1983). Not all patients
want precise information or benefit from it. This is particularly the case
with cancer and other life-threatening conditions, where supply of bad
news is a rather sensitive issue. For example, a study by Siminoff and
Fetting (1991) found that patients who did not accept their physician’s
treatment recommendations were told in more specific terms what the
benefits of the treatment would be. The study suggested that provision
of detailed information will not always provide desirable results and in
fact may lead to different therapy decisions than the physicians might
hope for, such as departure from her recommendations.
Doctors, on the other hand, through their communication style can
positively influence these beliefs and therefore contribute to better adher-
ence to recommendations (Bultman and Svarstad 2000). However, they
are often unable to understand differences in patient preferences regarding
information and participation during consultation (Elkin et al. 2007).
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They often fail to listen to patients and explore their views on their disease
and medication. Moreover, the doctor, just as the patient, also experiences
feelings during the consultation such as anxiety and anger, which have
been shown to decrease the overall satisfaction of both parties and also the
patient’s adherence to recommendations (Waitzkin 1984).
The transmission of information during the doctor–patient interaction
has been shown in the literature to be related to the clinical setting
(Waitzkin 1984). Busy clinical settings often imply that the doctor may
be restricted in the time she can spend with every patient. She may there-
fore fail to provide information due to a heavy work load and time
limitations.
Following the discussion above, four aspects of the doctor–patient rela-
tionship that affect supply of information and may impact on nonadher-
ence are important for our analysis. First, information affects a patient’s
beliefs and these have an impact on the patient’s decision regarding treat-
ment. Secondly, patients vary in their preferences regarding information.
Some patients want precise information, while others are better off when
they do not receive much detail about their condition. Models based on
the PEU theory take this into account. Thirdly, doctors do not appear to
be consistently able to predict patient preferences. This uncertainty con-
cerning the patient’s type introduces an element of asymmetric informa-
tion between the two parties, which is captured in our model by presenting
a game of complete but imperfect information. Finally, supply of infor-
mation requires effort from the doctor’s side, which she wishes to reduce
given time constraints and working load.
We now combine all these elements to develop our noncooperative game
theoretic model aiming to explore whether it may explain nonadherence to
recommendations. We also wish to apply comparative statics to the opti-
mal decisions and thus obtain policy recommendations.
3 The Model
3.1 Background information and assumptions
The model takes the form of a game in an extensive form. It is a non-
cooperative game between two players; the patient (‘he’) and the doctor
(‘she’). It is played in the present (Period 1) when decisions are made
taking into account the expected state of health of the patient in the
future (Period 2). The patient has symptoms of an illness and visits the
doctor. He does not have precise information about his state of health and
relies on the doctor to make the diagnosis. The doctor makes a diagnosis
that, given the recommended treatment, the patient’s state of health
in Period 2 will be s1 with probability P and s2 with probability 1 P,
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where s1<s2. This is the best diagnosis the doctor can make. The medical
recommendation may refer to medication taking, exercise uptake or diet
suggestions.
Patients vary in their preferences regarding the amount of detailed infor-
mation they want to receive and, following the work by Miller (1987), are
distinguished between ‘blunters’ (B), i.e. information averse, and ‘moni-
tors’ (M), i.e. information-loving patients. The type of patient, in our
model, is decided by Nature (N). This is a summary term which is used
to denote all factors, which determine the type of patient who visits the
doctor.
In general, the doctor cannot tell with certainty whether the patient is a
monitor or a blunter. Given the circumstances she can only make a guess.
With probability q, she believes that the patient is a monitor and with
1 q he is a blunter. Under this uncertainty, the doctor decides whether to
transfer (T) to the patient all the information, i.e. to tell him that he can be
in state s1 with probability P and in s2 with 1 P or not to transfer all the
details (NT). In the latter case, she calculates E½s ¼ P  s1 þ ð1 PÞ  s2
and tells the patient that his predicted state of health is E½s, if he follows
the recommendations, without disclosing details about s1 and s2. In case
the doctor plays T, the expected E½s can be calculated by the patient as
well.
The patient, after the information received by the doctor, needs to
decide whether to accept the recommendations and adhere (A) or not
(NA). Nonadherence in our model implies two things. First, it means
that if the patient does not follow the doctor’s recommendations, there
is a possible loss in his health denoted by l, which we assume to be a
nonnegative constant common for all types of patients, i.e. it is independ-
ent of patient’s preference regarding information. Second, nonadherence
implies that the patient decides to ignore the doctor’s advice, even when all
information is provided to him, i.e. he assumes that E½s is his state of
health and acts accordingly. This is precisely the case of the second and
sixth terminal nodes in Figure 2.
Consider the following example. A doctor sees a patient with a severe
heart condition and makes a diagnosis. She cannot tell with certainty how
many years the patient will live, yet she can say that if he follows her
recommendations, i.e. goes on a diet, stops smoking and takes the medi-
cation as prescribed, in the worst case scenario his life expectancy will be
2 years with 40% probability or in best case 10 years with 60%. On
average, his life expectancy is 6.8 years. The doctor can decide to reveal
the whole picture to the patient (T) or simply tell him that life expectancy
is 6.8 years (NT). If the patient of our example nonadheres (NA) he inten-
tionally disregards the information that his life expectancy can be as low as
2 and as high as 10 and only accepts that his expected life expectancy will
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be 6.8. In other words, in the PEU theory a monitor prefers early reso-
lution of uncertainty, while the blunter does not.
A key concept in our model is that of effort, which we assume the doctor
needs to expend in order to supply the information. The term "1 denotes
the effort of the doctor if the patient is a blunter and "2 her effort if the
patient is a monitor. Both "1 and "2 are positive constants and are sub-
tracted from the doctor’s utility function every time the doctor decides to
play T. It is assumed that "1 < "2. That is, more effort is needed to pass on
information to a monitor, who is an information-seeking person, than to a
blunter, who is information averse. This is a reasonable assumption based
on the literature which points out that information-loving patients are not
only more demanding (Miller 1995) but also more ‘difficult’ than infor-
mation averse ones (Miksanek 2008).
In addition, a number of emotions are experienced by both parties
during the consultation. Here, we denote by a the anger that is created
if a monitor realizes that the doctor has not told him all the truth. It is
assumed that a is a positive constant and it is subtracted both from the
monitor’s and the doctor’s utility. We assume that a > "2, i.e. the anger
created if the doctor does not pass on all the information is greater than
the effort the doctor puts in to do so. This would make the doctor be more
careful in expending the right amount of effort in making her
recommendation.
We denote by w the worry that a monitor experiences, without express-
ing it to the doctor, if he decides to follow her advice although he
has realized that she has not told him the truth. It is assumed that w
is a positive constant and it is subtracted from the monitor’s
utility. Both anger and worry are used in our model to capture what
Miller (1995) discusses, i.e. that monitors are not only more demanding
in seeking information but they also require more emotional atten-
tion than blunters as they experience a number of emotions during the
consultation. The constants "1, "2, a, and w are expressed in (dis)utility
terms.
Finally, by uM and uB we denote the utilities of a monitor and a
blunter, respectively, while uD is the utility of the doctor. Their basic
forms, before the relevant constants above are subtracted, are explained
in detail below.
The utility functions used in our model have similarities to the ones
developed by Ko¨szegi (2003) but they are not identical. They are based
on the PEU, which is defined not only over physical outcomes but also
over beliefs about future physical outcomes. The patient needs to decide in
Period 1 whether to follow the doctor’s advice according to what he
believes his health will be in Period 2. His von Neumann–Morgenstern
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type utility function depends ultimately on his health state s, the action he
decides to take, and is conditional upon his attitude to information.
We first consider the case of a blunter, i.e. an information-averse
patient. Similar to a risk-averse individual, who comparing utility to
expected utility does not take a fair gamble, an information-averse patient
prefers to know what the expected state his health can be rather than
knowing the probabilities with which he will be in worse or better state.
Or as Ko¨szegi (2003) puts it he ‘dislikes bad news more than he likes good
news’. Consequently, the utility function for the information-averse
patient is (strictly) concave and differentiable [Figure 1(a)].
Knowing his expected health E½s gives him greater utility, uBðE½sÞ, than
the utility he would get if he expects to be in state s1 with probability P and
in state s2 with probability 1 P, which reduces his utility to E½uBðsÞ.
Using the example of the patient with the heart problem, if he is a blunter
he prefers to know that his average life expectancy is 6.8 rather than
knowing he may die in 2 years. The constant l can be either such that
uBðE½s  lÞ > E½uBðsÞ or uBðE½s  lÞ < E½uBðsÞ. The former case is pre-
sented in Figure 1(a). This means the patient may prefer to keep smoking
although he knows that this has implications (l) for his health. This gives
him greater utility than if he received the information and followed the
recommendations. The reverse case can also be presented on a graph and
can be interpreted.
For the information-loving monitor, the picture is reversed. He prefers
to know the probabilities with which his state of health will be better or
worse rather than knowing the expected state. His utility function is
convex throughout and differentiable [Figure 1(b)]. Knowing the prob-
abilities with which he could be in states s1 and s2 gives him a utility of
E½uMðsÞ, while knowing the expected state of health reduces his utility to
uMðE½sÞ.
s1
s1
s2
s2
ls − ][sE
uM
uB
E[uM(s)]
E[uB(s)]
uM(E[s]−l)
uB(E[s]−l)
lsE −][ ][sE
(a) (b)
Figure 1 Utility function for a blunter (a) and a monitor (b).
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Of course, the patient will also take into account the possible loss in
health, if he does not follow the doctor’s recommendation, and the con-
stants expressing his emotions if he is not happy with the consultation.
For the doctor’s utility function, we make two assumptions. First, her
utility increases as the patient’s health does, but she is information neutral
to his prospects of health, i.e. her utility is linear, that is uD ¼ c  sþ d,
where following a normalization u0D ¼ duD=ds ¼ c ¼ 1. Linearity implies
that uDðE½sÞ ¼ E½uDðsÞ and also that uDðE½sÞ  uDðE½s  lÞ ¼ c  l ¼ l.
Second, she takes into account the effort she needs to put in every
time she transfers information, as well as the negative atmosphere,
i.e. anger, a, that is created if she does not pass on the full information
to a monitor.
The calculation of the payoffs of the doctor and the patient is done by
taking into account their preferences about information, the strategies
chosen by both players, the effort expended and the possible anger and
worry caused. After the relevant constants are subtracted from the utility
functions, we obtain the payoffs which we assume are revealed by nature.
For example, if the patient decides to nonadhere he will soon observe a
deterioration (l) in his health. The revelation of payoffs by nature takes
place only at the end of a complete path, from the initial to a terminal
node. This implies that the doctor cannot infer the identity of the patient
by observing, for instance, the anger of a monitor who is not being given
the information he wants.
Both the doctor and the patient consider the effect of their own
actions, taking into account the choice of their opponent, with a view of
maximizing their individual payoffs. Therefore, the game we present is
noncooperative.
We now consider the model in detail.
3.2 The structure of decisions in the model
The extensive form of the game is presented through the tree in Figure 2.
Nature (N) moves first, at time 0, and selects the type of the patient. The
doctor does not know the type of the patient she is dealing with. This is
represented in the game tree by the information set I shown by the dotted
closed curve, which contains two nodes. When the doctor finds herself in
I and wishes to play a pure strategy then it must be the same from both
nodes. This is the significance of the information set I. The game described
is of complete but imperfect information and perfect recall.
In order for the doctor to be able to take an action, and thus for the
optimal paths to be calculated, she attaches a probability q that the patient
is a monitor and a probability 1 q that he is a blunter. The value of q
may imply that the doctor knows exactly the wheel that Nature spins in
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selecting the patient, i.e. q is the true proportion of monitors in the popu-
lation of patients. On the other hand, q may also represent the beliefs of
the doctor, perhaps on the basis of collected information through a
number of previous consultations that the patient chosen by Nature is
of a particular type with a given probability.
A specific case of q is considered in detail. This is the case of q¼ 1/2,
which implies that if there is really no reason to suppose that the patient is
of either type one or the other type, a way forward is for the doctor to set
q¼ 1/2.
Following the decisions of the doctor, the patient will act and decide
whether to adhere or not to the recommendation.
As explained above, the doctor’s pure strategies are {NT,T}. Each pure
strategy is played from both nodes in information set I.
The payoffs of each player depend on the strategies chosen by both
players and are given by the vectors at the terminal nodes, with the first
element referring to Player 1, the doctor, and the second to Player 2, the
patient.
3.2.1 The game under perfect information
First, we consider briefly the circumstances when the doctor has full infor-
mation concerning the type of patient. This covers, e.g. the case where the
patient is in a position to reveal his preferences to the doctor. Obviously,
q¼ 1, with certainty, corresponds to the case where there is only one type
of patient, i.e. a monitor, and q¼ 0, with certainty, when the patient
is definitely a blunter. In other words, in both cases the doctor knows
Figure 2 Extensive form of the game indicating the optimal paths if doctor
plays T.
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exactly the type of patient she is dealing with. Then, the analysis is
straightforward.1
We discuss the two cases separately. If the patient is known by the doc-
tor to be a monitor (M) and she has given him the information he wants,
i.e. she has played T, then he will play A since E½uMðsÞ > uMðE½s  lÞ as
shown in Figure 1(b). So, in this case the patient will adhere. However, if
the doctor plays NT, i.e. she does not pass on all the information, and
the player is a monitor, then he will get angry and will express his anger
in his payoff. This reduces both the utility of the patient and the doctor
by a. In addition to that, the constant w is used to express the patient’s
worry if he accepts the treatment while he knows that the doctor
has not passed him all the information he wanted. This brings the
patient’s utility further down, in a way that it is assumed to imply:
uMðE½s  lÞ  a > uMðE½sÞ  a w. In this case therefore, the patient
will play NA, i.e. he will not adhere to the doctor’s recommendations.
Taking into account the optimal responses of the patient, the action
which maximizes the payoff of the doctor is T, because
E½uDðsÞ  "2 > uDðE½s  lÞ  a because a > "2. Therefore, she decides
to reveal all the information. The analysis justifies the conclusion that
the optimal path is (T,A). The doctor has taken into account the
patient’s preferences and the latter has responded positively. We have
also obtained the characterization of a subgame perfect equilibrium,
which is a Nash equilibrium from every node that the player might
have to act.
Let us now consider the case when the patient is known to the doctor to
be a blunter (B). If she plays NT, i.e. she does not give all the information,
then the patient will decide to play A because uBðE½sÞ > uBðE½s  lÞ. On
the other hand if the doctor plays T, then it depends on the relation
between uBðE½s  lÞ and E½uBðsÞ. The two possibilities are shown on
Figure 1(a). For relatively small l, we have uBðE½s  lÞ > E½uBðsÞ, the
patient prefers not to adhere and will play NA. For large l, we have
uBðE½s  lÞ < E½uBðsÞ. The patient is frightened that the possible loss in
health is too big if he does not follow the doctor’s recommendation and
decides to play A, i.e. to adhere. In all circumstances, taking into account
the optimal responses of the patient, the action which maximizes the
payoff of the doctor is NT. Therefore, she decides not to reveal all the
information.
The analysis justifies the conclusion that the optimal path is (NT, A).
The doctor has taken into account the patient’s preferences and the latter
1 For more details see Stavropoulou and Glycopantis (2008).
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has responded positively. We have also obtained the characterization of a
subgame perfect equilibrium, in which if the doctor plays T, the choice of
the patient will depend on the value of l.
Hence, we have obtained the following:
Summary Statement 1
Under perfect information, in the case of the monitor, the optimal deci-
sions are that the doctor plays T and the patient A. In the case of the
blunter, irrespective of the relationship between uBðE½s  lÞ and E½uBðsÞ,
the optimal decisions are that the doctor plays NT and the patient A. We
have also characterized the subgame perfect equilibria.
In both the case of a monitor and that of a blunter, the patient adheres
and this has significant implications which we consider in the discussion
section.
3.2.2 The game under imperfect information
We now return to the general case when the doctor finds herself in infor-
mation set I. As said above, the dotted closed curve shows that the doctor
does not know exactly where she is in the information set I. She will attach
probabilities, expressing her beliefs, q that the patient is a monitor and
1 q that the patient is a blunter.
Below, given 0  q  1, we consider the optimal decisions of the patient
and the doctor. We note that given the beliefs of the doctor, the optimal
paths describe a Nash equilibrium, since nobody can improve his payoff
given the strategies of the other. In more technical terms, the optimal
decisions describe an assessment equilibrium (Binmore 2007), as it is
defined not only in terms of what the players do, but also in terms of
what they believe. The case of insufficient reason is given special attention
as describing a possible situation when the doctor and the patient meet for
the first time.
Case 1
First, we conduct the analysis under the hypothesis that
uBðE½s  lÞ > E½uBðsÞ. When the patient has to act he knows exactly his
type, i.e. whether he is at point 2 or 2’ etc., therefore, if he is a blunter and
he respond to T with NA and to NT with A. If he is a monitor he will
respond to T with A and to NT with NA. He is aware of his payoffs and
he can reach an optimal decision. Following the optimal decisions of the
patient, the tree in Figure 2 folds up into the one in Figure 3. This shows
the moves available for the doctor, along with the payoffs for every move
for both the doctor and the patient.
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If the doctor plays NT her payoff will be
UNT ¼ q  ½uDðE½s  lÞ  a þ ð1 qÞ  uDðE½sÞ ¼ uDðE½sÞ  q  l q  a
ð1Þ
If the doctor decides to play T her payoff will be
UT ¼q  ðE½uDðsÞ  "2Þ þ ð1 qÞ  ½uDðE½s  lÞ  "1
¼ q  l q  "2 þ uDðE½sÞ  l "1 þ q  "1
ð2Þ
We now examine for which q, let us call it q*, the doctor is indifferent
between playing T or NT. For this to hold, the payoffs of the two actions
must be equal, i.e. UNT ¼ UT. Employing (1) and (2), we require
q  ½uDðE½s  lÞ  a þ ð1 qÞ  uDðE½sÞ ¼q  ðE½uDðsÞ  "2Þ þ ð1 qÞ
 ½uDðE½s  lÞ  "1
ð3Þ
Or equivalently
q  lþ q  a ¼ ð1 qÞ  ðlþ "1Þ þ q  "2 ð4Þ
This is the marginal condition that for indifference between the two
actions the expected loss in utility from playing NT must equal that
of T. This is an important marginal condition of the type that is encoun-
tered throughout economic theory.
The solution to the above equation, q*, is given below:
q ¼ ðlþ "1Þ=ðlþ "1 þ lþ a "2Þ ¼ X=ðXþ YÞ ð5Þ
where X ¼ lþ "1 > 0 and Y ¼ lþ a "2 > 0
We also conduct a comparative statics analysis by calculating the
partial derivatives. We have @q=@a < 0 and @q=@"2 > 0. With respect
to "1 we have @q
=@"1 ¼ ðlþ a "2Þ=ð2lþ "1 þ a "2Þ2 which is
Figure 3 Backward induction.
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positive since lþ a "2 > 0. With respect to l, we have
@q=@l ¼ ða "2  "1Þ=ð2  lþ "1 þ a "2Þ2, which is an inconclusive
result as the numerator can be positive, negative or zero. This is due to
the fact that as the possible loss in health increases this affects the utility of
both the monitor under action NT and the blunter under T. This loss in
health is reflected in a decrease in the doctor’s payoff and therefore, it
affects both UT and UNT. Both these functions decrease and the strength
with which they do so depends on the belief of the doctor as to the type of
the patient. The overall outcome is inconclusive.
The doctor’s decision whether to supply all the information or
not depends on whether UT is greater or less than UNT, respectively.
The two functions are shown graphically in Figures 4(a) and (b).
For q> q*, the doctor will be playing T while for q< q*, she will be
playing NT.
From the above, we derive further comparative statics results.
From Equations (1) and (2), we obtain that as "1 and "2 go up, i.e.
the required effort of the doctor to pass on information increases,
she will be more willing to play NT. On the other hand as "1 and "2
decrease she will be more willing to play T. Furthermore, when a
increases, i.e. the anger of the monitor goes up when the doctor
does not pass on all the information to him, she will be more willing
to play T. However, when a decreases the doctor will be more willing to
play NT.
We have thus obtained the following:
Summary Statement 2
Case 1 was constructed under imperfect information, i.e. for 0  q  1,
and for a relatively small l. The optimal decision of the monitor will be to
adhere if the doctor plays T and nonadhere is she plays NT. The optimal
decision of the blunter is not to adhere if the doctor plays T and to adhere
is she plays NT. The doctor taking into account the patient’s optimal
responses will play T, i.e. she will transfer all the information, if q> q*,
and NT if q< q*, where q* implies UNT¼UT. The latter relation implies
that the marginal condition of equality between the expected loss of
actions NT and T is satisfied. The value of q* changes as the parameters
a, "1, and "2 change.
We now want to examine what the doctor will do in the particular case
when she attaches equal probability to the patient being a monitor or a
blunter, i.e. q¼ 1/2.
The doctor is indifferent between playing T or NT or when q¼ q*¼ 1/2.
Equivalently, we have
X=ðXþ YÞ ¼ 1=2 , "1 ¼ aþ "2 , "1 þ "2 ¼ a ð6Þ
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4 (a) The utilities UT and UNT for "2 > "1 þ l (Case 1). (b) The utilities
UT and UNT for "2 < "1 þ l (Case 1).
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In order to interpret the above conclusions, we write the above condi-
tion (6) as
ð1=2Þ  ð"1 þ "2Þ ¼ ð1=2Þ  ð0þ aÞ ð7Þ
The left-hand side of the above Equation (7) is the average disutility
of effort if the doctor plays T and the right-hand side is her average
disutility if she plays NT. When this holds, the doctor is indifferent
between UNT and UT and therefore she is indifferent on whether to play
T or NT.
The doctor will play NT if UNT>UT which, based on the above, is
equivalent to "1 þ "2 > a. This implies q*>1/2. Following the interpret-
ation used above, this means that the doctor will not pass on all the
information to the patient if the average disutility of effort of providing
the information is greater than her average disutility if she does not. The
patient will then play A, i.e. will adhere, if he is a blunter or NA, i.e. will
not adhere, if he is a monitor. The optimal decisions describe an
equilibrium.
When UNT<UT, that is equivalent to "1 þ "2 < a. This implies
q*<1/2. The doctor will pass on all the information to the patient if
the average disutility of effort of doing so is lower than her average dis-
utility if she does not. The patient will then play A, i.e. will adhere, if he is
a monitor or NA, i.e. will not adhere, if he is a blunter. Again the optimal
decisions describe an equilibrium.
For q*<1/2 and q¼ 1/2, the optimal paths are shown in Figure 2
through the black lines from the nodes in the information set to two
terminal nodes. This of course holds under the assumption that
uBðE½s  lÞ > E½uBðsÞ.
The above results mean that for q¼ 1/2 an equality between "1 þ "2 and
a will be replaced by an appropriate inequality as parameters change, and
the doctor will no longer be indifferent between playing T or NT.
Hence, we have obtained the following results.
Summary Statement 3
In the case of insufficient reason, i.e. for q¼ 1/2, the doctor taking into
account the optimal responses of the patient, as described in Summary
Statement 2, will be indifferent between playing NT and T, if the marginal
condition of equality between the expected loss of the two actions is
satisfied. This now takes the form ð1=2Þ  ð"1 þ "2Þ ¼ ð1=2Þ  ð0þ aÞ,
which means that the average disutility of effort if the doctor plays NT
must equal that of playing T. A change in the parameters will imply that
the doctor will opt for one of the actions.
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Case 2
We now consider briefly the implications of the alternative hypothesis
uBðE½s  lÞ < E½uBðsÞ. This holds for a big enough l. The first implication
is that at node 2’’ in Figure 2 the blunter will choose to adhere to the
doctor’s recommendation. As a result, in Figure 3 the payoffs on
the branch NBT will be replaced by E½uDðsÞ  "1 and E½uBðsÞ for the
doctor and the patient, respectively. This means that Equations (2–5)
will be adjusted accordingly. Equations (1) and (2) are now written in
the following way:
UNT ¼ uDðE½sÞ  q  a q  l ð8Þ
UT ¼ uDðE½sÞ þ q  "1  "1  "2  q ð9Þ
Hence for UNT ¼ UT, we require
q  lþ q  a ¼ ð1 qÞ  "1 þ q  "2 ð10Þ
This is again the marginal condition that for indifference between the
two actions the expected loss in utility from playing NT must equal that
of T. This is an important marginal condition of the type that is encoun-
tered throughout economic theory.
The solution to Equation (10) is given by
q ¼ "1=ðlþ aþ "1  "2Þ ð11Þ
In terms of comparative static results, straightforward calculations
imply that @q=@l < 0, @q=@a < 0, @q=@"1 > 0 and @q=@"2 > 0. In other
words, as a and l increase q* decreases while as "1 and "2 increase so
does q*.
For q> q*, the doctor will be playing T while for q< q*, she will be
playing NT (Figure 5).
From the above, we derive further comparative statics results. From
Equations (8) and (9), we obtain that as "1 and "2 go up, i.e. the required
effort of the doctor to pass on information increases, she will be more
willing to play NT. That is similar to the Case 1. On the other hand, as "1
and "2 decrease she will be more willing to play T. Furthermore, when a
increases, i.e. the anger of the monitor goes up when the doctor does not
pass on all the information to him, she will be more willing to play T.
However, when a decreases, the doctor will be more willing to play NT.
Similarly, when the loss of health due to nonadherence increases, i.e. l
increases, the doctor will be willing to play T, which can be interpreted
as a way of shocking the blunter.
Under the principle of insufficient reason, i.e. q¼ 1/2, straightforward
calculations imply that the relations between "1 þ "2 and a will be replaced
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by those between "1 þ "2 and aþ l. In particular, relation (7) will take the
form:
ð1=2Þ  ð"1 þ "2Þ ¼ ð1=2Þ  ðaþ lÞ ð12Þ
Again the interpretation is similar to that of (7) in the case where,
uBðE½s  lÞ > E½uBðsÞ. The left-hand side denotes the average disutility
if the doctor plays T. The right-hand side denotes the average disutility
if the doctor plays NT.
The simplicity and the explicit form of both (7) and (12) relate to the
linearity of the doctor’s utility function. We note that w, expressing a
monitor’s worry that he is following a recommendation although he has
not been told all details, does not enter into the marginal condition. This is
so because w does not enter into the doctor’s payoff.
With respect to comparative statics results the strength of l will be
added to that of a. Apart from this change, the effect of a variation
in the parameters on the decision of the doctor will be analogous to
Case 1. In particular for q*¼ 1/2 will now be achieved for a smaller
value of a.
Figure 5 The utilities UT and UNT for "2 > "1 (Case 2).
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We have now obtained the following results:
Summary Statement 4
Case 2 was constructed under imperfect information and for a relatively
large l. Again, the optimal decision of the monitor will be to adhere if the
doctor plays T and nonadhere if she plays NT. On the other hand,
the blunter will adhere if the doctor plays NT but he will also adhere if
she plays T. This is due to the fact that he will be frightened from the large
value of the possible loss, l, if he does not adhere. Again the doctor takes
into account the optimal responses of the patient. Both in the case of the
general 0  q  1 and that of insufficient reason, the marginal condition
of equality between the expected loss of actions NT and T is now different
because the expression for UT does not contain l. Hence, the value of q*
that satisfies the marginal condition will be different. Of course changes in
the value of the parameters away from the marginal condition will mean
that the doctor will opt for one of the actions only.
All these comparative statics results provide useful insights for under-
standing the welfare implications that can be derived from the analysis.
They will be discussed below.
4 Discussion, Welfare Implications and Policy
Recommendations
We consider now the significance of our model both in terms of theoretical
contributions, policy recommendations, and welfare implications.
From a theoretical perspective, to the best of our knowledge, this is the
first attempt to develop a model that explains why an individual, may not
adhere to the recommendations of an expert. This is the case where the
information that the expert passes on affects the emotions of the individ-
ual who receives it. We relax the assumption of perfect agency, that pre-
vious article have adopted, by allowing the doctor to have her own, linear
utility function, and introducing the notion of effort that she needs to
expend when supplying information to the patient. Moreover, their deci-
sions depend on different elements. The doctor’s utility is independent of
the particular information preference of the patient and effort is rather a
general concept that is employed to demonstrate that she is not expected
to maximize merely the patient’s utility function. It has been used here as a
proxy for a set of factors, and in future research their particular effect
could be explored further.
Consideration of the effort that will be needed during the consultation
impact on the doctor’s decision and consequently on the patient’s decision
to adhere or not. The results show that the doctor will compare her
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expected disutility of putting in effort with the expected disutility of not
doing so. The latter will include the anger of a monitor patient who real-
izes that he has not been told the truth. The patient will be more willing to
accept the doctor’s recommendation if she has successfully supplied the
information he wants regarding his state of health.
Asymmetry of information played an important role in our model.
Indeed, when the doctor had exact knowledge of the patient’s type the
analysis showed that the patient would receive the type of information he
wanted and would adhere. When, on the other hand, the doctor failed to
capture a patient’s preferences he would not adhere.
The assumption of asymmetry of information is more appropriate in
situations where the patient visits the doctor for the first time to get a
diagnosis, and there is no prior information regarding the type of the
patient. An interesting expansion of the model, and a better approxima-
tion of reality, would be to consider explicitly the case where the patient
visits the doctor more than once. In this case, it might then be possible for
the doctor to deduce the patient’s type from the effort that she put in
previously and his subsequent state of his health. This will have implica-
tions for the subsequent games played. It may partially explain why visits
to the doctor over longer periods, may improve adherence among patients.
The model suggests that decisions depend also on the size of l, i.e. how
significant the possible loss in health due to nonadherence is. For relatively
large l, the doctor has more reason to supply the information and play
T. In this case, interestingly enough, the blunter despite being information
averse will adhere to the recommendations. This may be perceived as the
doctor successfully passing on the information in an attempt to ‘shock’ the
blunter, who then follows the recommendations.
Frank explains that Gilboa and Schmedler (1995) argue that ‘policies
that reduce distortions in decision making would be viewed as welfare
improving’ (Frank 2007: p. 218). Our model supports this view. From a
policy perspective, the model clearly supports tailored care as a way of
improving adherence rates. Patients who were given the type of informa-
tion they wanted were more likely to adhere to the recommendation of the
doctor. Provision of all the information will not always give desirable
results and in fact may lead to different therapy decisions from those
that the physicians might hope for (Siminoff and Fetting 1991). Indeed,
the literature on tailored care has shown that interventions which focus on
the patient’s individual needs increase satisfaction with care and improve
adherence rates (Kreuter et al. 2000).
To enhance tailored care, a number of interventions can be suggested,
such as better doctor’s training to increase her ability to detect different
information preferences. In addition, administrative support may also be
helpful. Various instruments have been validated and repeatedly used to
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identify ‘monitoring’ and ‘bluntering’ preferences. The miller behavioral
style scale (MBSS) is one of the most well known and frequently used
instruments developed by Miller (1987). Completing this scale enables the
doctors, especially when seeing patients for the first time, to have infor-
mation regarding the type of patient they are about to meet and therefore
pass on the appropriate information.
An obvious suggestion to reduce conflict between the desire to improve
the patient’s health and the effort doctors need to put in would be to
reward them for this effort. Yet, if financial incentives are given as a
reward to doctor’s effort, results will not be straightforward and may
have unintended consequences. In particular, as shown in both Cases 1
and 2, as "1 and "2 decrease due to the reward the doctor tends to play T,
i.e. she will tend to pass on to the patient all the information. This would
increase adherence rates among monitors, i.e. information loving patients
but will have the opposite effect for blunters.
Our model also showed that the doctor’s decision to put effort into the
consultation depends also on a, i.e. the negative atmosphere created when
a monitor realizes that she has not passed on all the information. The
constant a can be perceived as the lack of trust developed during the
consultation. If a decreases, i.e. an atmosphere of more trust is created,
the model shows that the patient reaches the same decision. However, the
doctor could move from an indifference point to the possible "1 þ "2 > a.
In this case, the doctor will play NT. In other words, for situations in
which the consultation is characterized by trust, i.e. a small a, the doctor
can put in less effort, i.e. spend less time with the patient and still achieve
adherence. As the model shows this is to the benefit of the blunter.
5 Concluding Remarks
The investigation in our article has focused on the doctor–patient rela-
tionship and the supply of emotional information that the consultation
very often involves. We showed that this can lead to nonadherence to
medical recommendations, a particularly significant problem for health
care as it reduces health outcomes and increases expenditure. In our ana-
lysis, we have attempted to consider the various factors which affect the
patient’s and the doctor’s decisions and may explain why the patient
departs from the doctor’s recommendation. Of course, the model applies
in general when information has to be passed on in an emotional setting.
For example, a teacher gives advice to her stressed student regarding pos-
sible exam results, avoiding disappointing him if he is information averse
but at the same time encouraging him to adhere to a strict working
schedule.
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Our methodological contribution is that we relax the perfect agency
assumption, which has dominated the literature, in order to capture reality
which is that patients and doctors have different utility functions. We also,
allow for asymmetry of information. Our game theoretic approach cap-
tures patients’ differences in preferences for information about their
health, and allows for interdependent decisions to be made. By doing
so, we provide an explanation of nonadherence. Yet, we show that even
when conflict exists between the two parties it is possible to achieve better
adherence rates and we identify the conditions under which this is the case.
This is important from a policy perspective.
Having considered the welfare implications of our model, we make a
number of policy recommendations, including that of care tailored to the
patient’s information needs. Better medical training, as well as adminis-
trative support which identifies the type of patient, can contribute toward
tailored and more personalized care. We also show that financial rewards
for the doctor’s effort may benefit the information-loving patients but will
not have the same effect on those who are information averse. Finally, we
show that in situations where the potential health loss due to nonadher-
ence is high, the doctor is better off passing on all the information even to
information-averse patients, as this will ‘shock’ them and lead them to
adhere.
To conclude, our model was developed to capture the basic features
of existing empirical evidence regarding the behavior of the two parties.
It was built under specific but reasonable assumptions and offers an inter-
dependent decisions analysis and a complete resolution of the game.
It also employs a comparative statics analysis and gives economic inter-
pretations. It draws upon the current new ideas in the literature of psych-
ology and economics which have contributed greatly to our understanding
of the doctor–patient interaction. Of course there is need for continual
updating of both the empirical evidence and the theoretical investigation.
The present article adds to the cumulative theoretical and policy recom-
mendations knowledge in the area.
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